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PROHIBITION, STARE DECISIS, AND THE
LAGGING ABILITY OF SCIENCE TO
INFLUENCE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
WESLEY M. OLIVER*
Science has revealed that, contrary to longstanding intuitions,
eyewitnesses are sometimes mistaken and false confessions do occur. The
methods police use to obtain identifications and confessions can affect their
reliability. Yet criminal procedure does not deter investigatory methods that
produce unreliable evidence as thoroughly as it does those methods that
produce reliable evidence. If an officer conducts an illegal search of a car
trunk, the evidence is excluded and subsequently officers know that they must
follow the rules if they hope to admit the fruits of such searches. If, however,
an officer creates a suggestive lineup—which risks a false conviction—the
identification from this lineup is not necessarily excluded. Interrogation
methods that risk unreliable confessions are not even a concern for the rules
of criminal procedure unless the suspect’s will is overborn, or the suspect
has not agreed to be interrogated. The explanation for this state of affairs
appears to be historical. Our rules of criminal procedure largely derive from
the era of Prohibition, when searches for reliable evidence were society’s
primary concern. Now that wrongful conviction is at least as great a concern
as unreasonable searches, the law should acknowledge the need to deter
police practices that risk the collection of unreliable evidence.
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University; B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale.

993

7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER

994

11/29/2016 2:12 PM

OLIVER

[Vol. 105

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 994
I. PROHIBITION LED TO ACCEPTANCE OF EXCLUSION OF RELIABLE
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ...................................................................... 998
II. THIRD DEGREE FEARS OF THE ROARING ‘20S TAKE FOCUS OFF
RELIABILITY ................................................................................. 1007
III. EFFORTS TO CABIN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE LEAVE
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS UNDER-REGULATED .................. 1022
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1030
INTRODUCTION
Investigatory constitutional criminal procedure is, in many ways,
backwards. Police are more effectively deterred from minimally intrusive
misconduct that produces reliable evidence than they are from engaging in
misconduct that threatens wrongful convictions. Physical evidence obtained
in an unlawful seizure is excluded merely because of the means of the
seizure,1 while efforts by police to contaminate confessions or eyewitness
identifications yield the exclusionary sanction only if courts find that police
misconduct produced unreliable evidence. 2 Police are thus given greater
latitude under our constitutional scheme to manufacture false evidence than
to discover legitimate evidence.
This anomaly can only be explained by the historical context of modern
constitutional criminal procedure. While the current scheme of police
regulation has roots in jurisprudence prior to the Prohibition Era, from 1920
to 1933, it was the rampant excesses during Prohibition that led states to
adopt draconian rules excluding reliable physical evidence 3 and prompted
1
See Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation
Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 391 (2010) (describing the
justification of the rule throughout its history).
2
Unreliable confessions are excluded, if at all, only under evidentiary rules that very
liberally admit evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (stating the
admissibility of a potentially unreliable statement “is a matter to be governed by the
evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486 (2006) (describing
the exclusion of unreliable confessions as a “largely forgotten purpose of the rules” regulating
interrogations). Intentional efforts by police officers to produce suggestive lineups do not
necessarily invalidate the resulting identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 93,
111–13 (1977) (rejecting per se exclusion of suggestive lineups).
3
See Francis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure,
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widespread concerns about police practices, notably interrogation practices.4
Third-degree tactics came into disrepute in the 1920s even when they
produced reliable confessions. 5 Inaccurate eyewitness identifications were
hardly contemplated, but reckless and destructive alcohol searches and thirddegree tactics made front-page news. Police abuses in this era were feared
for their own sake, irrespective of their potential to produce wrongful
convictions.6
The criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s largely
constitutionalized the scheme of police regulation developed as state courts
responded to police excesses created, exacerbated, and highlighted by
Prohibition. Mapp v. Ohio, which required states to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence, was justified in light of state adoptions of the exclusionary
rule, most of which occurred during Prohibition.7 Miranda v. Arizona traced
its origins to the findings of the Wickersham Commission Report, a
Prohibition Era re-telling of decades-old interrogation abuses. 8 Whatever
merits Miranda may have as the primary mechanism of screening
confessions, ensuring reliability is not one of them.9
Neither the recent spate of DNA exonerations, 10 nor scientific
52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 246, 250 (1961) (observing that “most of the
states that accepted the ‘Weeks Rule’ did so during the period of national prohibition”).
4
See Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 100 (1986)
(describing Wickersham Commission as first successful effort to reform police interrogators);
Franklin E. Zimring, The Accidental Crime Commission: Its Legacy and Lessons, 96 MARQ.
L. REV. 995, 997 (2013) (observing that the focus of the Wickersham Commission was
Prohibition).
5
MARILYNN JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK
CITY 125 (2003) (“Public alarm over [third-degree tactics] in the Progressive Era . . . proved
fleeting and ineffective. In the 1920s, however, public debate over the third degree reemerged
with a vengeance.”).
6
See Zechariah Chafee, Jr. et al., The Third Degree: Report to the National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement, in NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, NO. 11, REP. ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 154–55 (1931).
7
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961); see also Allen, supra note 3.
8
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
9
See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody
for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 910 n.97 (1997) (“That the Miranda Court’s
reference to the reliability value was confined largely to a footnote referring to the possibility
of false confessions . . . reveals that the Court was concerned with some Fifth Amendment
values beyond the reliability of confessions.”).
10
See Sabra Thomas, Comment, Addressing Wrongful Convictions: An Examination of
Texas’s New Junk Science Writ and Other Measures for Protecting the Innocent, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 1037, 1038 & n.3 (2015) (observing that DNA has led to the exoneration of 325 people
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discoveries about the problem of false confessions,11 nor incorrect witness
identifications,12 have galvanized society to revamp the regulation of police
in the way that Prohibition did.13 As a result, the regime designed to guard
against over-zealous police continues to define the contours of constitutional
criminal procedure. Police brutality in the search for evidence is not a major
concern in modern society, while police contamination of confessions and
identifications has been shown to lead to wrongful convictions. 14 Our
patchwork rules of constitutional criminal procedure thus remain
backwards.15 They over-deter the collection of reliable evidence and underdeter the fabrication of false evidence.
Criminal procedure doctrines are being questioned as reliability is
becoming an increasingly important basis for admitting or excluding
challenged evidence. State courts and legislatures have gradually shown

in the United States as of January 2015 and suggesting that the rate of exonerations shows no
sign of decreasing).
11
See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2010) (observing that false confessions were
“present in 15–20% of all DNA exonerations”).
12
See Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An
Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 1 (2015) (observing that 75% of the first 250 DNA exonerations involved mistaken
eyewitness identifications).
13
Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133 (2008) (calling
for new vision of criminal procedure in light of recent exonerations); cf. DAVID A. HARRIS,
FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 57–77 (2012) (arguing that
police departments have played a role in the resistance to scientific developments).
14
Society’s relative concerns about even the search for evidence does not map onto the
way in which the Supreme Court chooses to regulate—and not regulate—search and seizures.
See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (describing results of an empirical study
on how relatively invasive society regards government intrusion). Obviously, police brutality
claims presently occupy a very high profile, but those cases do not involve searches for
evidence. As the Supreme Court recognized in Terry v. Ohio, constitutional criminal procedure
does little to prevent police misconduct that is not designed to obtain evidence, as the
exclusionary rule is the primary remedy for police misconduct. 392 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1968); see
also William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
446 (1995) (“The vast majority of the many rules that govern how police deal with suspects
do not concern the level of force the police apply. Rather, these rules govern what police can
see or hear.”).
15
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) (“[J]udicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment
are infamous for their byzantine patchwork of protections.”).
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greater concern about reliability in eyewitness identification,16 while federal
courts are increasingly unwilling to exclude reliable but illegally obtained
evidence.17 Yet, there has been no substantial effort to overhaul or overrule
the basic framework of constitutional criminal procedure.18 Instead, courts
have identified circumstances, which have not been previously considered
and are unrelated to the reliability of the evidence, in which evidence
otherwise inadmissible under Warren Court doctrines may be admitted. 19
Understanding that our scheme of criminal procedure has its origins in
Prohibition—a quirky period in America’s past—should make courts more
willing to overhaul criminal procedure in ways that are at least no less
sensitive to the risks of wrongful conviction than they are to risk of improper
searches.
Part I of this article lays the foundation for the historical claim,
illustrating the role Prohibition played in creating and prompting widespread
acceptance of a rule excluding reliable but illegally obtained physical
evidence to deter improper searches. Part II then demonstrates how the
Prohibition-created fear of investigatory police practices reoriented rules on
confessions to exclude statements because of police misconduct rather than
concerns about the reliability of improperly obtained confessions. Finally,
Part III describes the efforts of the Supreme Court to cabin, but not
16
See Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An
Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L.
REV. 759, 801–02 & n.300 (2013) (describing statutes in Illinois, Montana, and North Carolina
identifying lack of reliability as a basis for excluding evidence and calling on courts in those
states and elsewhere to screen confessions for lack of reliability); Jules Epstein, Irreparable
Misidentifications and Reliability: Reassessing the Threshold for Admissibility of Eyewitness
Identification, 58 VILL. L. REV. 69, 78–81 (2013) (discussing state court decisions making it
more difficult for prosecution to admit identifications from suggestive lineups).
17
See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and Burden of Proof, 3
VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 98–103 (2015) (describing the Roberts Court expansion of the Fourth
Amendment good faith exception).
18
See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (“[T]he Burger and Rehnquist Courts fundamentally reworked
constitutional criminal procedure through a gradual yet highly effective process of limiting
and chipping away at, and occasionally overruling, Warren-era precedents.”).
19
See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504 (1996). Steiker explains:

While the Court has left relatively intact its instruction to police officers about proper police
practices (conduct rules), it has changed radically the consequences of violating those instructions
(decision rules). While the Court did not purport to overrule the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule, just as it declined to overturn Miranda or Massiah, the Court nevertheless promulgated a
series of what I call “inclusionary rules.”

Id.
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fundamentally overhaul, this politically unpopular scheme of police
regulation, leaving largely unregulated the process of eyewitness
identifications.
I. PROHIBITION LED TO ACCEPTANCE OF EXCLUSION OF RELIABLE
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
The bulk of any course on investigatory criminal procedure involves
limits on searches for, and to a lesser extent seizures of, tangible and
intangible evidence.20 Courts have created more doctrines regulating police
tactics designed to uncover and obtain physical evidence and recordings than
they have for any other techniques of law enforcement.21 And, of course, this
evidence is almost always quite reliable. 22 Unless planted, the marijuana
found in a defendant’s pocket in all likelihood belongs to him; the
conversation intercepted on a wiretap is unlikely to falsely incriminate the
parties. The extensive limitations on the ability of police to obtain reliable
evidence are a relic of Prohibition.
The existence of a vast body of law governing searches and seizures is
not surprising. The exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of illegally
obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions, has given a host of litigants, for
almost a century, an incentive to require judges to define the parameters of
legitimate searches and seizures.23 The existence of the exclusionary rule is

20
A look at any of the leading casebooks on criminal procedure illustrates this point. See,
e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2016)
(discussing the Fourth Amendment doctrine for 436 of 624 pages); JOSHUA DRESSLER &
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (5th
ed. 2013) (investigatory doctrines relate to Fourth Amendment issues for 403 of 683 pages).
21
See Russell D. Covey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1867–68
(2005) (arguing that the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment should be extended to
interrogations as the Fourth Amendment provides greater protections).
22
See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Attorney General
on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
573, 610 (1989) (“The exclusionary rule excludes the most reliable evidence
. . . .”).
23
Those criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, holding that
evidence seized consistent with existing precedent is admissible, argue that without an
incentive to litigate Fourth Amendment issues, litigants will not bring new issues, and when
they do, courts will not be able to rule for defendants; thus Fourth Amendment doctrines will
not further develop. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth
Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and
Davis v. United States, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 253 (2011) (“Davis v. United
States wrestle[s] with the tension between the development of Fourth Amendment law and the
availability of Fourth Amendment remedies.”).
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the surprising part. The tradeoff the rule makes between reliability in criminal
trials and deterring police misconduct is so radical—and such a breach from
history—that one would expect that a substantial change in circumstances
would have been required to create it. Yet the connection between the
exclusionary rule and Prohibition has been largely overlooked.
The rule was roundly rejected prior to Prohibition as undermining the
reliability of trials.24 The country’s split personality on Prohibition meant that
many would have liked to see the bootlegger—and certainly the bootlegger’s
customer—go free.25 Even more were willing to let the bootlegger go free to
deter police from engaging in the aggressive searches for alcohol that have
come to be iconic images from the Roaring ‘20s.26
The full history of the exclusionary rule—and therefore the depth of the
connection between Prohibition and the rule—is not well known, as most
scholars assume the United States Supreme Court created the rule in Boyd v.
United States in 1886. 27 A willingness to sacrifice reliability to deter
24
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 786–87 (1994) (citing examples of nineteenth century judges rejecting that the
admissibility of evidence turns on the method of its seizure).
25
See J. ANNE FUNDERBURG, BOOTLEGGERS AND BEER BARONS OF THE PROHIBITION ERA
163 (2014) (observing that many Philadelphia-area magistrates objected to Prohibition and the
search and seizure efforts required to enforce it).
26
Id. (observing that some Philadelphia area magistrates objected to the efforts to enforce
Prohibition but not necessarily to Prohibition itself); cf. Frederic A. Johnson, Some
Constitutional Aspects of Prohibition Enforcement, 97 CENT. L.J. 113, 122 (1924) (observing,
and lamenting, that enforcement of Prohibition could not occur without effectively repealing
the Fourth Amendment).
27
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). United States Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart, writing in one of the country’s leading scholarly publications, is among those to
ignore the development of the exclusionary rule in state cases prior to Boyd. Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983)
(“[T]he first case associated with the development of the exclusionary rule is Boyd v. United
States.”); see also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 n.9 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing Boyd as origin of exclusionary rule); TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 3 (2012) (“Boyd v. United
States and Weeks v. United States [] established the foundation for what would become the
rule that individuals were entitled to keep illegally acquired evidence out of criminal
proceedings.”); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 107 (1937) (“The first [Fourth
Amendment] case of real importance was decided in 1886. This was Boyd v. United States,
one of the leading cases on the subject of search and seizure, a case which did much to chart
the subsequent course of federal law.”); Amar, supra note 24, at 787 (describing Boyd as the
case that allowed the exclusionary rule to “creep” into American law); William J. Stuntz,
Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017–18
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unlawful liquor searches, however, pre-dated the period of National
Prohibition by many decades and was prompted by state-level alcohol laws.28
In the mid-nineteenth century, states throughout the Northeast and Midwest
adopted versions of Prohibition.29 Fears of unlawful liquor searches under
these laws led a number of these states to adopt a version of the exclusionary
rule limited to unlawful alcohol searches.30
Liquor prosecutions under these laws were initiated when complainants
alleged that alcohol could be found in a particular place and at least one
complainant described the reason for believing the alcohol could be
discovered in this location.31 In a world of only a few nascent metropolitan
(1995) (“Boyd . . . laid the foundation for modern search and seizure and self-incrimination
doctrine.”). But see TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45
(1969) (“The exclusionary rule for unlawfully obtained evidence made its appearance in Iowa
in 1903, and was adopted for the federal judiciary by the Supreme Court decision in the Weeks
case in 1914.”).
28
See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV.
377, 399–419 (2011) [hereinafter Oliver, Modern History]; Wesley M. Oliver, Portland,
Prohibition, and Probable Cause: Maine’s Role in Shaping Modern Criminal Procedure, 23
ME. B.J. 210, 214–17 (2008).
29
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, BLACKWOOD’S EDINBURGH MAGAZINE 211 (1867)
(identifying the 13 states to adopt Prohibition in the mid-nineteenth century); see also Paul
Aaron & David Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in America: A Historical Overview, in
ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 141 (Mark H. Moore &
Dean R. Gerstein eds., 1981). Prohibition did not extend to the southeast in the nineteenth
century because of the linkage between the Temperance Movement and the Abolition
Movement, though Prohibition nearly succeeded in parts of the antebellum South, such as
Kentucky. See Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., “Moral Suasion Has Its Day”: From Temperance to
Prohibition in Antebellum Kentucky, in A MYTHIC LAND APART: REASSESSING SOUTHERNERS
AND THEIR HISTORY 19–42 (John David Smith & Thomas H. Appleton, Jr. eds., 1997).
Ironically, Prohibition then found some of its strongest support in the south in the early
twentieth century as the Ku Klux Klan, with its strongest (though not exclusive) support in the
southeast, strongly supported Prohibition. KATHLEEN DROWNE, SPIRITS OF DEFIANCE:
NATIONAL PROHIBITION AND JAZZ AGE LITERATURE, 1920–1933, at 20 (2005); Kris Durocher
& Amy Louise Wood, Ku Klux Klan, Second (1915–1944), in 24 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOUTHERN CULTURE 228–29 (Thomas C. Holt & Laurie B. Green eds., 2013).
30
See State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228, 230 (1854) (arresting conviction as complaint
authorizing search for alcohol was found to be inadequate since it failed to describe basis of
complainant’s belief of location of liquor); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. 1, 6 (1 Gray 1) (1854)
(discussing action to recover value of liquor seized on the basis of improper complaint, which
was analogous to modern search warrant); People v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289, 330 (N.Y.
Gen. Term 1855) (Strong, J.) (“The complaint [analogous to the modern affidavit in support
of a search warrant] is a substitute for an indictment . . . and requires at least as much
particularity.”); State v. Twenty-Five Packages of Liquor, 38 Vt. 387, 390–92 (1866)
(recognizing that action to forfeit liquor could be quashed when search warrant in
insufficiently particular).
31
There was some variation in the requirements for warrants in various states during the
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police forces, the enforcement of these laws fell on private citizens, the most
zealous possible enforcers of state prohibitory laws.32 Beyond concerns about
the new laws—and the searches that would be necessary to make them
effective—the objectivity of these witnesses raised serious concerns.33
Appellate courts responded by developing a mechanism to limit overreaching by these aggressive volunteer agents. 34 Judgments of conviction
were set aside when complainants failed to adequately describe a basis for
believing alcohol could be located in the place searched. These courts
regarded the entire prosecution to be a nullity, because the complaint, the
charging instrument, was invalid.35 Though this mechanism was limited to
liquor cases, and limited to cases involving bad complaints (what modern
lawyers would describe as invalid warrant applications), 36 this midnineteenth century innovation was undeniably an early version of the
mid-nineteenth century version of Prohibition. Some states required more than one
complainant, but many obviously did not. Not all states required the complainant to describe
the reasons for his belief that alcohol could be found in a particular location. The practice of
permitting a complainant to assert his belief that alcohol could be found in a particular location
continued in some places through National Prohibition in the 1920s, when such a basis for a
search warrant for liquor was struck down in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
Many states, however, began to require, for the first time in ordinary criminal cases,
complainants to provide magistrates a basis for their suspicions. See Oliver, Modern History,
supra note 28, at 403–08 (describing development of requirement that a complainant provide
a basis for his suspicions in nation’s first prohibitory law in Maine). This was actually quite
an innovation in search and seizure law, which had previously merely required a complainant
to allege that he believed evidence of a crime could be discovered in a particular place. Fabio
Arcila and I examined form books and actual warrant applications from the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century to arrive at this conclusion. See id.; Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the
Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable
Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 40 (2007) (observing that “justices of the peace presented
with search warrant applications easily could have concluded that they did not have an
absolute duty to engage in probable cause sentryship.”); Oliver, Modern History, supra note
28, at 378 (“Probable cause was essentially a pleading requirement. . . .”). But see Thomas Y.
Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal and
Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” is
Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 78 n.122 (2010)
(relying on magistrate’s manuals to conclude that magistrates required affiants to provide the
basis of their reasoning).
32
See FRANK L. BYRNE, PROPHET OF PROHIBITION: NEAL DOW AND HIS CRUSADE 39
(1961).
33
Id. at 42.
34
See Oliver, Modern History, supra note 28, at 410–11.
35
Id.
36
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled in 1873 that a judgment of conviction would
not be arrested if an officer seized liquor without a complaint. State v. McCann, 61 Me. 116,
118 (1873).
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exclusionary rule. Courts were refusing to permit prosecutions for liquor
possession to proceed because of the unlawful manner in which the
contraband alcohol was seized.
Contemporaneous with the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment,
most states enacted provisions complementing the federal ban on alcohol.37
As states attempted to enforce these new laws, state courts began anew to
embrace a rule that prevented a conviction when the police employed
unlawful means to search for alcohol.38 The early twentieth century versions
of the exclusionary rule in the states, consistent with the federal rule and
unlike their nineteenth century predecessors, were not specific to liquor
enforcement.39
Certainly federal courts, first with the opinion in Boyd v. United States40
and then more clearly in Weeks v. United States,41 fashioned a version of the
exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions prior to Prohibition that was not
limited to liquor cases. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States made clear
that this version of the federal exclusionary rule was not merely a generic
version of the state rules in liquor cases ordering the return of property.42
Silverthorne not only required the improperly seized property to be returned
but also barred the use of the information learned from improperly seized
documents.43 This version of the exclusionary rule was not just limited to
liquor cases or the remedy of replevin, as almost all of the pre-Prohibition
state rules had been. Before Prohibition, then, the federal courts had gone far
beyond the state court decisions in liquor cases and created a rule greatly
resembling the rule applicable in modern courts. State courts, however, did
not embrace this version of the rule until Prohibition.
Even at the turn of the twentieth century, well prior to incorporation of
the guarantees in the U.S. Constitution against state encroachment,44 it would
37

See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24–25
(2006).
38
See Allen, supra note 3, at 250.
39
Id.
40
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
41
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding the illegally seized papers must
be returned to defendant and may not be used in his trial).
42
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
43
Id. at 391.
44
See Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The
View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 397–99 (2005) (describing the period of
incorporation from 1932 to 1969). The United States Supreme Court’s first effort to exert
supervision of any sort over state court proceedings appears to have occurred in United States
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seem hard to argue that precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court had little
relevance. The reality was, however, that federal decisions had little impact
on the American criminal justice system at that time. The FBI was not created
until 1908. 45 Federal proceedings even today constitute only a small
percentage of the total number of criminal prosecutions in this country,46 but
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal criminal
docket was negligible. 47 Federal procedures, while providing persuasive
insights on how states might administer their criminal justice systems, were
applied so infrequently as to barely be detectable. Prior to the Weeks decision,
it was often claimed that only one state adopted a generic version of the
exclusionary rule—Iowa in 1903, 48 almost twenty years after Boyd and a
decade before Weeks.49 Almost immediately after efforts began to enforce
Prohibition, however, states began to adopt the exclusionary rule.
Prohibition awakened Americans to threat of unlawful searches and
seizures. Prohibition prompted officers to conduct searches that much of
society found offensive. 50 An Assistant United States Attorney handling
liquor cases in New York City observed in 1923:
v. Shipp, in which the Court, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
ordered a retrial of a defendant who received a sham of a trial in state court, and ordered the
defendant transferred to federal custody for his protection pending trial. 214 U.S. 386 (1909).
In Shipp, the Court held the sheriff in contempt for failing to protect the defendant from a
lynch mob. Id. at 386–87. For an incredible description of the extraordinary facts of the case,
see MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999), which should be
required reading for admission to any bar in this country.
45
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE FBI: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1908–2008 (2011).
46
Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643, 675–79 (1997) (observing that while state prosecutions are far more common than
federal prosecutions, the likelihood of conviction, and the penalty, in federal court is
considerably higher).
47
Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm
or “Crying Wolf?”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1322–30 (2000) (describing history of federal
regulation of crime). Learned Hand, then a United States District Judge in Manhattan, opposed
Prohibition because it flooded federal courts, turning them into low-level criminal courts. See
MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 85–86 (2007).
48
State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903). Interestingly, though, the Sheridan opinion
reads much like the nineteenth century liquor cases that arrested a judgment of conviction and
returned illegally seized alcohol to the victim of the illegal search. The Iowa Supreme Court
reasoned in Sheridan that “parties will be restored to the rights and positions they possessed
before they were deprived thereof by . . . fraud, violence, or abuse of legal process.” Id. at 731.
49
See Allen, supra note 3, at 249–50. Sarah A. Seo, The Fourth Amendment, Cars, and
Freedom in Twentieth Century America 103 (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Univ. 2016).
50
See, e.g., John Barker Waite, Evidence—Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42
MICH. L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1944) (describing destruction of bars once alcohol was found).
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For a time after the Volstead Act went into effect . . . few persons, even among lawyers,
conceived the idea of questioning any Federal Government agent’s right to search for
and seize contraband liquor as he felt inclined or as his suspicions directed. The agents
themselves, and many of their superiors, felt secure in their right to do so as
Government officials.51

The Wickersham Commission observed in 1931 that Prohibition had
gotten off to a “bad start” in part because:
High-handed methods, shootings and killings, even where justified, alienated
thoughtful citizens, believers in law and order. Unfortunate public expressions by
advocates of the law, approving killings and promiscuous shootings and lawless raids
and seizures and deprecating the constitutional guarantees involved, aggravated this
effort. Pressure for lawless enforcement, encouragement of bad methods and agencies
of obtaining evidence, and crude methods of investigation and seizures on the part of
incompetent or badly chosen agents started a current of adverse opinion in many parts
of the land.52

The relationship between the new federal and state liquor laws, their
enforcement, and the adoption of the exclusionary rule has been grossly
understated. Zechariah Chafee in 1922 attributed the adoption of the
exclusionary rule in the states to “the effect of the Supreme Court decisions
[in Boyd, Weeks, and Silverthorne] . . . beginning to be felt.”53 John Henry
Wigmore, perhaps the most vocal critic of the exclusionary rule, objected in
principle to the exclusion of reliable evidence as undermining the truthseeking function of a court to deter police misconduct. 54 Wigmore’s
Prohibition-era rants against the exclusionary rule did not observe that the
public had become outraged by a rash of police misconduct in the search for
alcohol, nor did his post-Prohibition objections to the exclusionary rule
contend that the misconduct prompting the rule’s widespread-adoption no
longer existed. 55 Finally, the Wickersham Commission’s broad-reaching
consideration of the criminal justice system, a study prompted by the effect
Prohibition had on law enforcement, did not weigh in at all on the fact, or
51

Victor House, Search and Seizure Limits Under the Prohibition Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 1923, at X14.
52
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 722, at 45,
46 (1931).
53
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919–1922, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 696
(1922).
54
See John Henry Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches and Seizures,
8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922).
55
See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184 (2d ed. 1923); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184 (rev. 1961).
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wisdom of the exclusionary rule.56
Nevertheless, the primary role Prohibition had in making the
exclusionary rule the primary method of police regulation cannot be denied.
The majority of states to adopt the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio
did so during Prohibition,57 and did so in cases involving violations of their
state’s prohibitory laws.58 In fact, only two of the states that adopted and
maintained the exclusionary rule during Prohibition did so in cases that did
not involve violations of liquor laws.59
The role of Prohibition may best be illustrated by the exclusionary rule’s
history in New York State. In 1903, the New York Court of Appeals stated
in People v. Adams, as many other state courts had, that the manner in which
evidence was obtained did not affect its admissibility.60 Nevertheless, a flurry
See Records of the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1960) (listing state court cases adopting
exclusionary rule); see Allen, supra note 3.
58
See Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922) (alcohol seized in restaurant); State v.
Arregui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927) (bare-bones accusation of liquor sale in a search warrant
application is insufficient); People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (Ill. 1924) (officers, in search for
liquor, exceeded scope authorized by warrant); Flum v. State, 141 N.E. 353 (Ind. 1923) (still
discovered on property broadly described in warrant); Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W.
860 (Ky. 1920) (search of home for liquor without warrant); People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W.
557 (Mich. 1919) (search of home for liquor without warrant); Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845
(Miss. 1922) (search of home for liquor without warrant); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 (Mo.
1924) (search of person for liquor without suspicion); State ex rel. King v. Dist. Ct. of Fourth
Judicial Dist. Missoula Cty., 224 P. 862 (Mont. 1924) (search of buildings inadequately
described in warrant); Gore v. State, 218 P. 545 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923) (mere belief that
alcohol can be found at the location in question found insufficient to justify a warrant); State
v. Gooder, 234 N.W. 610 (S.D. 1930) (mere belief that alcohol was at the scene); Hughes v.
State, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. 1922) (recognizing in case involving seizure of alcohol post-arrest,
that illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash.
1922) (search of automobile for liquor unlawful); State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261 (W. Va. 1922)
(dependent was arrested without cause and had alcohol on him); Hoyer v. State, 193 N.W. 89
(Wis. 1923) (search of a car without probable cause yielded five bottles of liquor).
Interestingly, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute creating the exclusionary rule after the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the exclusionary rule in a liquor case. Robert O.
Dawson, State-Created Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure: A Study of the Texas
Experience, 59 TEX. L. REV. 191, 195–98 (1981).
59
See State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958 (Or. 1922) (sabotage case); State v. George, 231 P. 683
(Wyo. 1924) (larceny case). New York, much like many northern states, had adopted a liquorspecific mechanism functioning much like the modern exclusionary rule in the mid-nineteenth
century.
60
People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (N.Y. 1903) (“[T]he court, when engaged in trying
a criminal cause, will not take notice of the manner in which witnesses have possessed
themselves of papers or other articles of personal property which are material and properly
offered in evidence.”).
56

57
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of trial and appellate court opinions during Prohibition began to exclude
evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police conduct.61 Of course, Judge
Cardozo in 1926, which would seem to be the height of Prohibition, famously
rejected the exclusionary rule. Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of
Appeals, quite memorably wrote that the criminal should not go free because
the constable blundered.62
New York had a reputation for being a fairly progressive jurisdiction
and Benjamin Cardozo similarly had a reputation as being a fairly
progressive judge. Cardozo’s rejection of the exclusionary rule therefore
often has served as a compelling argument for opponents of the rule. The
history of Prohibition in New York, however, explains why Cardozo would
not have had the same concerns as many other judges of his era. After the
election of Al Smith as Governor of New York in 1922, New York repealed
its prohibitory law, meaning that officers were no longer searching for
alcohol.63 New York courts followed Adams until Prohibition when trial and
appellate courts began to embrace the exclusionary rule, but by the time the
New York Court of Appeals was called upon to re-consider the exclusionary
rule in 1926, Prohibition had effectively ended in the Empire State, even
though the federal effort at Prohibition would continue until 1933.
With Mapp in 1961, the Supreme Court required the strong minority of
states that had not yet adopted the exclusionary rule to exclude illegally
obtained evidence to deter unlawful searches and seizures and preserve the
integrity of the judiciary.64 Remarkably, one of the Court’s arguments for
imposing this requirement on the states was the trend of state courts to
embrace the rule.65 Prohibition thus not only prompted a number of states to
61

See, e.g., People v. Kinney, 185 N.Y.S. 645 (Crim. Ct. 1920) (ordering return of
defendant’s revolver discovered in a search of his home for opium on the basis of an invalid
warrant); State v. One Hudson Cabriolet Auto., 190 N.Y.S. 481, 481–82 (Saratoga Cty. Ct.
1921) (returning alcohol seized and dismissing action for unlawful alcohol possession); People
v. 738 Bottles of Intoxicating Liq., 116 Misc. 252, 257 (Saratoga Cty. Ct. 1921) (holding that
dismissal and return of alcohol is the appropriate remedy for unlawfully seized alcohol);
People v. Jakira, 193 N.Y.S. 306 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922) (seizure of pistol in residence without
warrant required suppression); In re Search Warrant to Search & Seize Intoxicating Liqs., 190
N.Y.S. 574 (Orange Cty. Ct. 1921) (search of address other than one listed in warrant required
suppression of evidence discovered).
62
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926).
63
Post, supra note 37, at 32–33 (discussing Al Smith’s view that the states were not
required to assist the federal prohibitory effort); Comment, Enforcement of the 18th
Amendment in the Absence of State Legislation, 36 YALE L.J. 260, 260 (1926) (observing New
York’s repeal of the Mullan-Gage Act).
64
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961).
65
Id. at 651–52, 660.
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adopt the rule, but played the largest role in the Supreme Court imposing this
rule on states long after the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.
Even though he failed to recognize the social circumstances prompting
the creation of the exclusionary rule, Dean Wigmore’s description of the rule
was undeniably correct—reliable evidence is sacrificed to deter misconduct.
Courts in the past few decades have been more sensitive to the loss of reliable
evidence.66 The limits of the Fourth Amendment have increasingly shrunk
since the early 1970s as categories of exceptions have been carved to the
exclusionary rule. 67 More recently, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have expanded good faith rules to prevent the exclusion of reliable
evidence. 68 Nevertheless, the rules governing searches and seizures for
reliable evidence remain more complex and restrictive than constitutional
rules governing either interrogations or identification procedures, each of
which pose significant risks for false conviction.69
II. THIRD DEGREE FEARS OF THE ROARING ‘20S TAKE FOCUS OFF
RELIABILITY
The public’s keen awareness of police lawlessness during the era of
Prohibition reoriented the focus of American law on confessions from
reliability to deterrence. Up until the Prohibition Era, confessions obtained
by improper methods were excluded because the methods were believed to

66
Laurence Naughton, Taking Back Our Streets: Attempts in the 104th Congress to
Reform the Exclusionary Rule, 38 B.C. L. REV. 205, 220 (1996) (“In recent years . . . the
Supreme Court has determined with increasing frequency that the cost of excluding reliable
evidence outweighs the deterrent effect that suppression would produce.”).
67
See Smith, supra note 18, at 1060 (describing the chipping away of Fourth Amendment
protections); Steiker, supra note 19, at 2500 (describing the Court’s presentation of Warren
Court doctrines but limiting their reach).
68
See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011) (describing and criticizing Supreme Court’s
decision finding that good faith record-keeping errors by police will not require exclusion);
Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
463, 484–89 (2009) (same); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757,
786–87 (2009) (same). The Supreme Court and lower federal courts are very rapidly
expanding the good faith exception. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)
(incorrect interpretation of traffic law by officer will not yield suppression); see also United
States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding police officers reasonably relied on
precedent allowing warrantless tracking by crude beepers to assume that warrantless GPS
tracking was acceptable).
69
See Stuntz, supra note 14.
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risk false confessions.70 Third-degree methods became a concern for the first
time during Prohibition despite the much older lineage of these abuses. 71
Understandably, courts wanted to deter torture, whether it created a risk of
producing or produced false confessions, but Prohibition has left us with a
scheme of regulating confessions that under-appreciates reliability
concerns.72 The very real possibility of false confessions, revealed by recent
exonerations, shows that the constitutional scheme regulating confessions
leaves something to be desired.73
The Supreme Court has, from its first interrogation cases, assumed the
Due Process Clause requires that a confession satisfy the common law
voluntariness test. Voluntariness is, and has always been, a term of art.
Because it is impossible to read minds, there is certainly no way to know
when a statement has been involuntarily extracted—or, what it would mean
to involuntarily extract a confession. The Supreme Court has recognized that,
in some sense, all confessions are involuntary in that they are prompted by
an official request for a statement from a suspect. 74 Until Prohibition,
however, courts considering the voluntariness of a statement looked at factors
the court believed to bear on the statement’s reliability. In a time when false
confessions were not studied as they are today, surely there was often
considerable guesswork involved, but confessions were nevertheless
excluded because of fears that they would falsely incriminate the accused. As
Prohibition created a fear of police excesses, the voluntariness test was re-

70

See Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 309, 323–25, 331 (1998) (observing that pre-1936 cases were based on reliability
though claiming Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), was not a departure from
reliability in the Supreme Court); cf. Leo et al., supra note 2, at 492–93 (contending that Bram
was also motivated by reliability concerns).
71
Widespread third-degree tactics are widely believed to have begun in the United States
in the late-nineteenth century. See Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of
Psychological Interrogation in the United States, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND
ENTRAPMENT 52 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); see also TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, A
PICKPOCKET’S TALE: THE UNDERWORLD OF NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 249–52 (2006)
(describing career of Inspector Thomas J. Byrnes, who is widely credited with bringing routine
uses of the third degree to the New York Police Department).
72
Well before Miranda, the voluntariness test did not contemplate the reliability of a
confession, nor does it in the post-Miranda world. See Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary
Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2014–20 (1998) (observing that interrogation
law is concerned with conduct of the officers, not the reliability of the confession).
73
See Leo et al., supra note 2, at 499 (objecting to lack of reliability in the consideration
of admissibility of confessions).
74
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); see also Joseph D. Grano,
Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979).
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conceptualized to prevent police conduct in interrogation rooms that overbear
the will of the suspect.
Historically, though, voluntary was a synonym for reliable. American
cases typically trace the origins of the voluntariness rule to the English case
of Regina v. Warickshall (1783), a case that actually deals with the admission
of evidence gathered as a result of an unlawfully obtained confession, rather
than the admissibility of a confession itself. Jane Warickshall confessed to
receiving stolen property after receiving “promises of favour,” and the details
of that confession led to the discovery of the stolen property “between the
sackings of her bed.”75 The court rejected the idea that confessions obtained
through trickery or threats should be excluded to discourage interrogators
from making threats or offering promises.76 The fruits of the confession were
admissible, the court reasoned, because once the property was located, the
accuracy of the confession was no longer in doubt. However, statements
obtained by threats or promises were not necessarily reliable and thus, the
court reasoned, inadmissible:
A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is
presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt. . . . [B]ut a confession forced from
the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a
shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be
given to it; and therefore it is rejected.77

The court reasoned that the discovery of the stolen goods hidden in
Warickshall’s bed was an incriminating fact whose evidentiary value did not
depend on whether the confession was true or false.78 If confessions were
excluded to deter the use of threats or promises in interrogations, then there
would certainly be some value to excluding the fruits of improperly induced
statements.
When the Supreme Court held in Bram v. United States in 1897 that due
process required a confession to be voluntary, reliability would remain at
least one of the reasons. 79 Though the Court also raised a concern that
confessions should not be obtained at the cost of sacrificing individual
autonomy, the Court continued to view the voluntariness rule as preventing
75

The King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 234; 1 Leach 263, 263.
Id. (describing as a “mistaken notion” the view that such confessions are “to be rejected
from a regard to public faith”).
77
Id. at 235.
78
Id.
79
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); see Leo et al., supra note 2, at 492–93
(observing that the Court grounded the basis for excluding the statement “in both the idea of
reliability and the idea of individual freedom”).
76
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the consideration of false confessions. 80 To prevent this risk, the Court
continued to embrace the very restrictive view on interrogation tactics that
had appeared in Warickshall and a number of treatises before and after
Warickshall: “A confession . . . whether made upon an official examination
or in discourse with private persons, which is obtained from a defendant,
either by the flattery of hope, or by the impressions of fear, however slightly
the emotions may be implanted, . . . is not admissible evidence.”81
As the Supreme Court’s first meaningful foray into confessions law,
Bram v. United States can hardly be ignored.82 But Bram is a puzzling case.
The officer’s promise, if it can be so construed, hardly seemed to threaten the
statement’s reliability or implicate a concern other than accuracy. The Court,
however, ignored a very real threat of physical violence against the suspect,
a threat that was increasingly becoming a routine part of police
interrogations, and focused on the vaguest of promises for confessing. 83
Warickshall’s very strict prohibition on threats and promises thus co-existed
with routine torture in interrogation rooms, a dichotomy one can see even in
the Bram opinion itself.
Bram, the first mate on a ship, was accused of murdering the ship’s
captain, the captain’s wife, and the second mate with an ax. 84 The crew,
having reason to suspect Bram and another member of the crew, placed them
both in irons until the ship reached Halifax, Nova Scotia, where they were

80

See Leo et al., supra note 2, at 492–93.
Bram, 168 U.S. at 547.
82
The Court had previously considered the issue of voluntariness in Hopt v. Utah, which
observed in a quite cursory fashion that there was no evidence contradicting the lower courts’
finding that a statement was voluntary. 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). Interestingly, the Court
observed in Hopt that “the rule against [a confession’s] admissibility has been sometimes
carried too far; in its application justice and common sense have too frequently been sacrificed
at the shrine of mercy.” Id. Three years later, the Court’s opinion in Bram would provide
perhaps the high-water mark of the type of mercy the Court decried. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey,
Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 477 (2005) (“Many slight pressures
applied by the police to a suspect that would have been considered unconstitutional under
Bram’s highly protective standard would now be considered permissible as being insufficient
to overbear the will of most suspects.”).
83
See Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L.
REV. 447, 454–56 (1938) (objecting to statements produced by “unlicensed barbarity of the
practice, which is almost a routine in some parts of the country, of torturing prisoners to extort
confessions,” but arguing that statements produced by promises should be excluded only if
untrustworthy).
84
Bram, 168 U.S. at 535–36.
81

7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER

2015]

PROHIBITION'S LINGERING IMPACT

11/29/2016 2:12 PM

1011

separately interrogated by local authorities.85 Before any questioning began,
the detective interrogating Bram began to strip him naked.86 As odd as this
procedure may seem to modern readers, the meaning of the act was likely not
lost on Bram.87 Lashing was a common punishment, both on the high seas
and in American jails during the nineteenth century.88 Victims were stripped
of their clothing to make the punishment more painful and humiliating.
Further, third-degree interrogation tactics were widely practiced, and were
known to be widely practiced by the late nineteenth century. Bram had to
believe that he was about to be whipped when the detective began his
questioning.89
It was not, however, the implicit threat of torture that the Supreme Court
found objectionable in Bram, it was the hope of benefit that the detective held
out with his questions. During the interrogation, he stated, “If you had an
accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime
on your own shoulders.” 90 This appeal to the defendant’s conscience was
sufficient to render the confession inadmissible, and was the only part of the
events surrounding the interrogation that the Court found worthy of
mentioning in its voluntariness analysis.
Conceding that, closely analyzed, the benefit which the conversation suggested was
that of the removal from the conscience of the prisoner of the merely moral weight
resulting from concealment, and therefore would not be an inducement, we are to
consider the import of the conversation not from a mere abstract point of view, but by
the light of the impression that it was calculated to produce on the mind of the accused,
situated as he was at the time the conversation took place. Thus viewed, the weight to
be removed by speaking naturally imported a suggestion of some benefit as to the crime

85

Id. at 561.
Id. at 561–62.
87
Id. at 563–64.
88
See, e.g., MARK E. KANN, PUNISHMENT, PRISONS, AND PATRIARCHY: LIBERTY AND
POWER IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 158 (2005) (“Penal reformers and officials who
approved of the use of the whip to discipline prisoners defended it against charges of cruelty,
barbarism, and injustice by portraying it as normal, moral, and effective. Well into the
nineteenth century, whipping was a ubiquitous punishment administered by parents to
children, teachers to students, and officers to sailors and soldiers.”); Art. V—Report of the
Massachusetts State Prison (Documents of the Senate, January, 1846. No. 3.), 2 PA. J. PRISON
DISCIPLINE & PHILANTHROPY 183, 185–93 (1846) (describing debate over whether lashings
ought to be abandoned in prisons).
89
See Murphy v. United States, 285 F. 801, 812–13 (7th Cir. 1923) (concluding that
Bram’s confession was involuntary, not because of an implied promise of a benefit, but
because stripping Bram was an implicit threat of flogging).
90
Bram, 168 U.S. at 564.
86
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and its punishment as arising from making a statement.91

Bram quickly became perhaps the most irrelevant Supreme Court case
in the history of American criminal justice—announcing a rule too restrictive
of police questioning to be followed and completely out of touch with even
the realities of contemporary police practices implicated by its facts.92 Bram
would also provide state courts a basis for treating police violence as
something other than a threat or promise. Such a decision could not have
come at a worse time, as third-degree tactics were just starting to become
commonplace in American police stations at the time Bram was decided.
While examples of torture-induced confessions are as old as confessions
themselves, the systematic use of torture as a regular feature of American
police interrogation is widely believed to have commenced in the late
1800s.93 While there were concerns raised about police brutality, especially
in the early years of the New York Police Department, the public ultimately
looked the other way as Progressives like New York Police Commissioner
Teddy Roosevelt argued that a police force, free of corruption, could be
trusted to use physical violence against the right people. 94 Police,
Progressives argued, could been trusted to identify guilty suspects and abuse
them with locust clubs on the street. Progressive reformers were less explicit
about their support for violence in interrogation rooms, though their
advocacy of police violence against the criminal element on the street was
quite explicit.
In state courts, where most interrogation practices were being
considered, judges looked the other way, even when there was substantial
evidence that police were torturing suspects. When there was a question
about whether a confession was voluntarily given—which often meant
whenever officers denied torture—state courts generally let the jury hear the
statement, but informed the jury that it was to disregard it if involuntarily
obtained.95
91

Id. at 564-65.
OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 25 (1973)
(“[T]he elaborate development of standards governing the admissibility of confessions in state
courts followed a course altogether different from that suggested by the Bram decision.”).
93
See Leo, supra note 71, at 52.
94
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 90–91, 124–25 (describing Roosevelt’s view of police
violence and observing that while incidents of police torture were known in the Progressive
Era, efforts at reform during this period “proved fleeting and ineffective”). Judge William J.
Gaynor criticized Progressive reformers for their belief that society could “be reformed and
made better . . . instead of being debased . . . by the policeman’s club and axe.” William J.
Gaynor, Lawlessness of the Police in New York, 176 N. AM. REV. 10, 25 (1903).
95
See Indian Fred v. State, 282 P. 930, 934 (Ariz. 1929) (“In most jurisdictions, if there is
92
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Torture during this period went from being the most forbidden
interrogation technique to the most permitted. Some mid- to late-nineteenth
century courts had imposed greater sanctions on statements extracted by
actual physical violence than statements extracted by the “flattery of hope, or
by the torture of fear.”96 Even though Warickshall and its extensive progeny
permitted the admission of physical evidence obtained as a result of an
involuntary confession, at least two courts held that physical fruits of a
tortured confession were inadmissible, even though the physical fruits were,
unlike a bare statement, unquestionably reliable. 97 By the early twentieth
century, physical violence was less a reason to exclude a confession than a
promise of leniency. As the New York Court of Appeals stated in People v.
Trybus in 1916:
The question is not . . . whether the detective struck defendant or held him illegally in
custody. Neither of these facts, per se, makes the reception of the statements in evidence
illegal as a matter of law, although they are properly to be considered by the jury in
determining the voluntariness of the statements.98

In Trybus, a private detective had been permitted to unlawfully detain a
suspect in the Buffalo jail, where he initially visited physical violence on his
prisoner and obtained a statement from him that he and Buffalo detectives
swore “was obtained without threats or promises.”99 In addition to the assault
and illegal detention, Trybus contended that he was promised leniency in
exchange for his confession, which the officers denied. The New York Court
of Appeals concluded that the question of the statement’s voluntariness had
appropriately been left to the jury because, “[a]side from the rough handling
and the illegal custody, which are not denied, there is no uncontradicted

a conflict of evidence on the question, and the court is not satisfied that the confession is
voluntary, it should submit it to the jury with instructions to disregard it if upon all the evidence
they believe it to be involuntary.”); see generally H. Rockwell, Annotation, Voluntariness of
Confession Admitted by Court as Question for Jury, 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933) (describing cases
in which voluntariness is a question for the jury).
96
The King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 235; 1 Leach 263, 264.
97
See Rusher v. State, 21 S.E. 593, 594 (Ga. 1894) (“The fruits of physical torture, as
distinguished from mere fear, it would seem, ought to be unavailing. The honor and decency
of the law would seem to be involved in rejecting them. The law ought to hold out no
encouragement to violent and lawless men to commit crime for the sake of detecting a previous
crime, and bringing the offender to punishment.”); Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382, 386 (1856)
(“[I]f it appeared that the confession had been extorted by violence, [the law] also protects [the
defendant] against testimony which could only be discovered, or made available through the
instrumentality of such confession.”).
98
People v. Trybus, 113 N.E. 538, 540 (N.Y. 1916) (citation omitted).
99

Id. at 539.
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evidence of threats or promises.” 100 Uncontradicted claims of physical
violence, combined with illegal custody, were thus not enough to prevent a
jury from hearing the confession, though uncontradicted evidence of a threat
or a promise apparently would have been sufficient.
Courts thus gave the green light to outrageous police conduct in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even those readers generally aware
of the existence of third-degree tactics are apt to be disturbed by the extent
of official torture in the history of American law enforcement. Those rightly
shocked by the in-court admissions of Mississippi deputies who obtained
tortured confessions in the seminal case of Brown v. Mississippi,101 may be
surprised to learn that this degree of candor was not isolated. Wisconsin
officers, for instance, similarly boasted of beating a confession out of a
suspect in 1920, leaving marks so telling that a physician testified that the
suspect “must have suffered extremely.”102 One of the officers in that case,
when asked if he had beaten the suspect, responded “what we ought to have
done would be to kill him.”103 Semi-official interrogation devices were not
limited to the iconic rubber hoses.104 At least two police departments built
versions of the electric chair to be used in interrogations, delivering painful
but less-than-lethal amperage.105
The tolerance of such extraordinary force—some of the specifics of
which were undeniably kept from the public—depended on enormous trust
in police officers to correctly identify guilty suspects.106 Prohibition eroded
the public’s confidence in law enforcement. Prohibition demonstrated that
corruption was intractable and that even honest enforcement was a thing to
be feared. It destroyed the faith Americans had developed in burgeoning
police forces and called into question the legitimacy of their tactics.107
100

Id. at 540.
Asked during the trial how severely he had beaten one of the suspects in that case, the
deputy sheriff answered, “Not too much for a negro.” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284
(1936); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
375 (1993).
102
Lang v. State, 189 N.W. 558, 560 (Wis. 1922).
103
Id.
104
There were certainly a number of documented uses of rubber hoses. See Note, The
Third Degree, 43 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618–19 (1930); Rowe v. State, 123 So. 523 (Fla. 1929);
People v. Sweeney, 136 N.E. 687 (Ill. 1922).
105
The Third Degree, supra note 104, at 619.
101

106

I have laid out this argument in much more detail in Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The
Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 483–515
(2010).
107
Id.
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This loss of faith in police shifted the focus of interrogation law from
the possibility of a false confession to a concern about brutality itself,
regardless of whether the resulting confession was reliable. Newspapers,
books, and even films by the 1930s detailed the horrors of police
interrogations. 108 In New York City, juries began to acquit defendants in
cases involving police interrogation with sufficient frequency to prompt even
trial judges supportive of the Progressive view of police violence to call for
investigations of interrogation methods.109 Jurors did not share the judiciary’s
faith in the reliability of tortured confessions and, with repeated public
accounts of police misconduct inside and outside interrogation rooms,
increasingly did not believe officers’ claims that they had not assaulted
suspects. Acquittals in cases involving confessions became quite common.
Legal reformers began to insist that courts more stringently supervise
interrogations. Without looking into individual cases, the traditionally
conservative New York Bar Association called on courts to more carefully
scrutinize confessions and not allow juries to determine the voluntariness of
confessions if there was evidence supporting a claim of brutality. Courts in
New York and beyond began to adopt this position.110
Reliability was no longer the sole focus of regulating interrogations—
reliability became a secondary concern. The frequency of torture and,
perhaps more importantly, the perception of the frequency of torture in
interrogation rooms that led to acquittals, needed to be reduced to restore the
public’s confidence in confessions and in police practices generally. The
practice of routine police torture, once thoroughly exposed, was itself rightly
seen as something to be condemned and deterred, even if the evidence
obtained through these methods was eminently reliable. The Wickersham
Commission’s report on interrogations in 1931—itself prompted by
President Hoover’s call for an evaluation of the enforcement of Prohibition—
concluded that third-degree practices risked unreliable confessions but
described the violent method of interrogation as “shocking in its character
and extent, violative of American traditions and institutions, and not to be
tolerated.”111
Coercive tactics thus came to be seen as problematic for their own sake.
Irrespective of the reliability of the confessions they produced, courts began
to exclude the fruits of improper interrogations at the same time that the
108
109
110
111

RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 44 (2008).
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 129–31.
Id. at 124–28.
Chafee, Jr. et al., supra note 6, at 155.
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exclusionary rule was gaining popularity as a method to influence police
practices.112 Judicial regulation of confessions on a basis other than reliability
was hardly a stretch at this point in history. Excluding the fruits of improper
searches only achieved the goal of fewer improper searches; excluding the
fruits of improperly conducted interrogations deterred potentially unreliable
confessions.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a doctrine regulating the exclusionary rule
provided the vehicle for decoupling reliability from confessions law in the
Supreme Court shortly after Prohibition. With the decision in Nardone v.
United States, the Court recognized the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine,
excluding evidence discovered as a result of information unlawfully learned,
unless the latter discovery was “so attenuated [from the illegal conduct] as to
dissipate the taint.”113 In Nardone, the government sought to use evidence
discovered as a result of an unlawful wiretap, not the words actually
intercepted by the wiretap. The Court concluded that derivative use of
unlawfully obtained evidence would undermine the deterrent rationale of the
exclusionary rule. “To forbid the direct use of [illegally obtained evidence]
but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods
deemed ‘inconsistent with ethical standard and destructive of personal
liberty,’” the Court reasoned. 114 Famed evidence professor Charles
McCormick suggested a year before the Nardone decision that the same sort
of deterrent justified excluding the fruits of tortured confessions.115
112

Academic commentators, for the first time during Prohibition, began to advocate use
of the exclusionary rule to deter unreasonable searches and seizures. See Thomas E. Atkinson,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM.
L. REV. 11, 24–25 (1925). To the extent academic commentators commented on preProhibition expressions of the rule, they either merely described the new rule or were quite
critical. See JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188–89 (1913); WIGMORE,
supra note 55; Wigmore, supra note 54. Of course, the United States Supreme Court had
adopted a clear version of the rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and had
stated a version of the rule that did not depend on the deterrence rationale in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Early versions of the rule, that seemingly had to rest on a
deterrence rationale, appeared in state court decisions as early as the mid-1800s. See discussion
supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.
113
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
114
Id. at 340. Nardone involved a case of wiretapping contrary to the prohibition of the
1934 Communication Act, which, unlike the present federal wiretapping rule, did not itself
contain a provision excluding evidence. For an excellent description of the background of
Nardone, see Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality
of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (2008).
115 See McCormick, supra note 83, at 454–55 (“Certainly the right to be immune in one’s
person from the secret violence of the police seems to be even more deserving of judicial
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The courts and the legislatures increasingly have come to believe that a
privilege to have the fruits of such a search or seizure suppressed as evidence
is needed to discourage the practice. The reason for extending to the person
from whom a confession has been wrung by torture, a similar privilege,
whether the confession be true or false, is even stronger.116
The Supreme Court would soon apply the deterrent rationale from
Nardone to unlawfully obtained confessions. Just as the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine required exclusion of the unlawfully obtained physical evidence
as well as evidence obtained as a result of the illegally discovered evidence,
subsequent voluntary confessions as well as physical evidence were to be
excluded when the product of an involuntary confession.117 If reliability was
the sole basis for determining voluntariness, subsequent confessions, and
certainly physical fruits of the confessions, would be admissible unless there
were reasons to suspect the reliability of these pieces of evidence.118 Courts
and commentators recognized that reliability was being augmented by a goal
of deterring police excesses in interrogation rooms. 119 McCormick, who
appears part insightful commentator and part prophet when viewed in the lens
protection than the immunity from searches and seizures. The courts and legislatures have
increasingly come to believe that a privilege to have the fruits of such a search or seizure
suppressed as evidence, is needed as a discourager of the practice. The reason for extending
to the person from whom a confession has been wrung by torture, a similar privilege, whether
the confession be true or false, is even stronger. Such policy as modern writers are able to
discover as a basis for the self-incrimination privilege—and it is feeble and inadequate at
best—pales to a flicker beside the flaming demands of justice and humanity for protection
against extorted confessions.”).
116
McCormick, supra note 83, at 454–55.
117
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (subsequent statement); United States v.
Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947) (dictum) (suggesting that physical fruits of an involuntary
confession might be excluded under principle announced in Nardone); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954) (subsequent statement); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)
(recognizing that unlawfully obtained statement and its fruits should be excluded); see also
Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 939 (1995) (“As the voluntariness test continued to evolve
in the middle part of the twentieth century, the results reached by the Court seemed to reflect
less a concern with the reliability of a particular confession than disapproval of police
interrogation tactics considered offensive or subject to serious abuse.”). Lower courts into the
1950s continued to admit the physical fruits of involuntarily obtained statements. Id. at 937–
39. Of course, the Supreme Court currently recognizes as hornbook law the exclusion of
“involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent
criminal trial.” United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004).
118
See, e.g., Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (admitting
statement after previous involuntary statement would “defeat the exclusionary rule”).
119
See Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 665 (1966).
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of history, observed in 1938:
Can we not best understand the entire course of decisions in this field as an application
to confessions both of a privilege against illegally obtained evidence—a privilege more
clearly emerging in the decisions as the courts more clearly perceive the hidden
iniquities of torture—and of an overlapping rule of incompetency which excludes the
confession when untrustworthy?120

Concerns about interrogation methods would then prevail as the sole
justification for excluding a confession as involuntary. In 1960, the Supreme
Court announced in Rogers v. Richmond that the reliability of a confession
played no role in evaluating its admissibility.121 Rejecting the trial court’s
legal standard that “took into account the circumstances of probable truth or
falsity,” the Court held:
The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for the purposes of the Federal
Constitution, on the question of whether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement
officials was such as to overbear [the suspect’s] will to resist and bring about
confessions not freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete
disregard of whether or not [the suspect] in fact spoke the truth.122

If reliability played no part in the voluntariness analysis, then even
completely unreliable statements could be admitted if there was no police
misconduct. This next logical step was taken in Colorado v. Connelly.123
Connelly, who was mentally ill and reported hearing voices, approached a
Denver police officer and told the officer he had committed a murder and
wanted to talk about it.124 The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were
reasons to conclude that Connelly’s statement was not reliable, but concluded
concerns about reliability did not provide a basis for concluding that the
statement was involuntary. The Court concluded even if the circumstances
under which a confession was given suggested that the statement was “quite
unreliable,” state or federal rules of evidence, not the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution, governed its admissibility.125
Most often, however, courts inquiring into the voluntariness of a
confession addressed factors that are related to a statement’s reliability. The
defendant’s age, education and intellectual capacity, and experience dealing
120

See McCormick, supra note 83, at 457.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
122
Id. at 543–44. See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of
the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.”).
123
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
124
Id. at 157.
125
Id. at 166–67.
121
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with the police all bear on whether he is likely to falsely incriminate himself
in the face of police questioning. 126 Under the voluntariness test, the less
sophisticated the suspect, the more likely his statement is to be deemed
involuntary.127
The voluntariness test, however, did not survive as the primary means
of regulating confessions. Frustrated with its own efforts, and the efforts of
lower courts, to identify and apply factors in the voluntariness test, the Court
in Miranda v. Arizona turned to a waiver approach.128 Miranda, designed to
prevent involuntary statements, asks only whether the suspect has been
informed of his or her rights and has waived those rights. So long as the
suspect has the intellectual capacity to comprehend the warnings and has
waived them, the Miranda inquiry goes no further.129
If the voluntariness test continued to be justified by a concern about
reliable confessions, Miranda could hardly be regarded as protecting it.
Practically, Miranda even turns the twentieth century voluntariness
considerations on their head. Those who are most willing to assert their rights
are not likely to be the poorly educated, low-functioning suspects who lack
experience with the criminal justice system—those who assert their rights are
likely to be just the opposite. Miranda confers yet another of the law’s
advantages on sophisticated players. Other things being equal, the more
educated, more sophisticated, and wealthier members of society are more
likely to invoke their right to the assistance of counsel. Those who have the
means to imagine engaging an attorney, and certainly those who have
attorneys on retainer can more easily envision the process of consulting with
counsel.130
126

See Steven Drizin & Richard Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in a Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (observing that the young and mentally ill were overly
represented in a sample of false confessors). Earl Washington’s confession provides an
example of circumstances in which adherence to many of the factors considered in the
voluntariness analysis, if seriously considered, would have prevented the admission of a false
confession. See Paul T. Hourihan, Note, Earl Washington’s Confession: Mental Retardation
and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1495–1501 (1995).
127
See White, supra note 72, at 2028 n.171.
128
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1966) (observing that the voluntariness
test risked overlooking a confession that was voluntary). An interesting recent commentary
suggests that because of the substantial limitations the United States Supreme Court has placed
on Miranda, voluntariness may once again be the primary method of confession regulation.
Eva Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness
Test, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2015).
129
But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (noting that age can be
considered in determining whether Miranda waiver was valid).
130
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1985), is one of the few interpretations of Miranda
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Sophistication, however, is not always about class or wealth in the
criminal justice system. Sometimes it is about experience. Repeat players—
recidivists—have street-smarts. They have experience in dealing with
attorneys, have learned the advantages of invoking their rights to silence and
counsel, and are not as intimidated by the criminal process as first-time
arrestees. These are the suspects who are most likely to invoke their rights to
silence and counsel. Miranda is not just rewarding past wrongs, it is stacking
the deck against reliability. Those with prior records are statistically more
likely to be guilty of crime than those with no criminal records. 131 Other
things being equal, Miranda has the effect of giving a right to silence that is
more likely to be exercised by guilty suspects than innocent ones.132 This
seeming irony is possible only because Miranda is aimed at guarding against
an involuntary confession, not an unreliable one.
This state of affairs would be bad enough if Miranda merely
supplemented the post-Prohibition version of the voluntariness test, which
does not formally recognize reliability as a goal. But Miranda went further.
As the Supreme Court has often noted, it is very difficult to demonstrate that
a statement is involuntary if there is a valid Miranda waiver.133 Miranda has
that does not privilege the more sophisticated. A person who has the means to have a lawyer
on retainer may not have that lawyer invoke his warnings for him, placing those with and
without lawyers on retainer on an equal footing. But many of the interpretations of Miranda
further the elitist protection of Miranda, such as the requirement that a suspect clearly invoke
his rights to silence and counsel. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (right to
counsel); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (right to silence). Heartier, more
sophisticated suspects are more likely to speak with the sort of clarity required to invoke these
protections.
131
See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (recognizing probative
value of prior bad acts, but also recognizing evidentiary rule excluding them because they risk
“confusion of the issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice”).
132
See George C. Thomas, III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 39
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2007) (noting that “[i]nnocent suspects, probably more than
guilty ones” resist invoking counsel).
133
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (“[G]iving the warnings and getting
a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement
is involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires
unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid
waiver.”); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (observing that Miranda
provides some clarity for officers and that claims of involuntariness are rare once there is a
valid waiver); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are
rare.”); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1523
(2008) (“[I]t turns out that following Miranda’s hollow ritual often forecloses a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness of a statement.”).
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thus replaced voluntariness’ totality of the circumstances test that considered
human frailties with a single-factor waiver standard that privileges the
heartiest members of society—and the most likely guilty. Not only does
Miranda do nothing to exclude unreliable confessions, it displaced a rule that
indirectly considered factors that bore on reliability.
Recent cases of wrongful convictions have demonstrated, contrary to
the supposition of many, 134 that false confessions do occur. 135 Factors
suggesting false confessions have been identified from these exonerations
and from statements given to police that subsequent investigation revealed to
be false. The leading nature of the questioning, officers’ suggestions that
there is incontrovertible evidence of guilt such as scientific evidence, lack of
knowledge by the suspect of non-public facts about the crime, and police use
of trickery are indicators of a potentially false confession. 136 Practices
compromising a confession’s reliability do not, however, undermine the
statement’s admissibility under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
voluntariness rule.137 State and federal rules of evidence exclude statements
with indicia of unreliability only if a court finds the risk of prejudice from the
statement substantially outweighs its probative value—a very difficult
standard to satisfy.138
Some interrogation methods are producing false confessions. 139
134

See Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431,
433 (2012) (“[F]alse confession is not a phenomenon that is known to the average layperson
as a matter of common sense.”).
135
See Drizin & Leo, supra note 126.
136
See J.P. Blair, The Roles of Interrogation, Perception, and Individual Differences in
Producing Compliant False Confessions, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 173, 183–84 (2007)
(noting that confrontation with false evidence is a common factor in false confessions);
Frances Chapman, Coerced Internalized False Confessions and Police Interrogations: The
Power of Coercion, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 159, 176, 191–92 (2013) (identifying factors
tending to produce false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe, Coerced Confessions: The Logic of
Seemingly Irrational Action, 6 CULTIC STUD. J. 1 (1989) (explaining common features of false
confessions).
137
See Leo et al., supra note 16, at 778 (“Perversely, the constitutional rules of criminal
procedure do not allow a trial judge to suppress confession evidence at trial on the grounds
that it is false and unreliable. Worse still, the constitutional law of criminal procedure provides
no doctrinal mechanism for either recognizing or suppressing contaminated and formatted
false confessions.”).
138
Id. at 794–98; see also Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 810–15 (1997) (criticizing then-current
law that permitted lying to suspects).
139
Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 920–21 (2004) (“[T]he research literature has established
that [false] confessions occur with alarming frequency.”).
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Miranda says nothing about the officer’s ability, post-waiver, to falsely
inform a suspect that others have implicated him, to erroneously tell the
suspect that forensic science has revealed his guilt, or to provide the suspect
with sufficient details of the crime so that his confession has the ring of
reliability. The substance of interrogations is largely unregulated. Police can
lie to suspects and even present them with false evidence, though some courts
exclude confessions when officers present suspects with false forensic
reports.140
Prohibition both created search and seizure issues and prompted limits
on searches and seizures. Brutal interrogation practices preceded the
Eighteenth Amendment by decades. Prohibition did, however, acutely arouse
concern about third-degree practices. The laudable desire to end such
practices, irrespective of the accuracy of their results, refocused American
confessions law in a way that would not account for twenty-first century
interrogation practices that risk false confessions.
III. EFFORTS TO CABIN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE LEAVE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS UNDER-REGULATED
The Prohibition Era’s most prominent rule certainly has not been
uncontroversial, and judicial efforts to retreat from it have left a hodgepodge
of police regulation. The exclusionary rule is justified by the incentives it
creates for officers to follow rules of constitutional criminal procedure as
they obtain evidence. When the evidence officers obtain may also be
unreliable because of the means used to obtain it, the justification for the
exclusionary rule would seem especially strong. While some degree of
concern about eyewitness identification is long-standing, relatively new
scientific research has demonstrated the severity of the problem with this
method of proof.141 By the time the Supreme Court considered whether the
140

Thomas, supra note 132, at 1308–10. An awful example of a court’s refusal to consider
the potential impact of lying to a suspect about forensic evidence can be seen in State v. Cope,
748 S.E.2d 194 (S.C. 2013) (falsely reporting results of forensic test did not render statement
inadmissible).
141
In 1927, Felix Frankfurter observed that “[t]he identification of strangers is
proverbially untrustworthy [and the] hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable
number of instances in the records of English and American trials.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE
CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1962). Nevertheless, it is clear that jurors tend to trust
eyewitness testimony when they should not. See Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert
Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93, 95 (1992). In the
last thirty years, scientists have taken a keen interest in the problem of eyewitness
identification. In the 1970s, only four articles contained the words “eyewitness” and
“identification” in the abstract, while more than two thousand studies were done of eyewitness
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exclusionary rule should apply to the fruits of improper identification
procedures, the Court’s view of the exclusionary rule had shifted
substantially.142 The lack of regulation of eyewitness interrogation appears to
be a function of the Court’s discomfort with the rule that excluded reliable
evidence and a respect for stare decisis that made the Court unwilling to
overrule or overhaul the rule. In the 1970s, the Court was quick to cabin the
exclusionary rule in ways that did not directly contradict prior cases to
maximize the admissibility of evidence.143
Manson v. Brathwaite, the seminal case on eyewitness identifications,
was decided during this period of frustration with the exclusionary rule.144
Nowell Brathwaite’s attorney quite understandably argued that the jury in the
defendant’s prosecution for selling heroin should not have heard testimony
describing how a Connecticut State Trooper identified him. 145 Trooper
Jimmy Glover, acting undercover, went to an apartment in Hartford where he
purchased two glassine bags of heroin from a man he had never met. 146
Afterwards, he drove from the apartment to police headquarters and
described the man, later believed to be Brathwaite, to Officer D’Onofrio from
the Hartford Police Department. D’Onofrio thought he recognized the person
Trooper Glover described. 147 Apparently the department had previously
suspected Brathwaite of wrongdoing because Officer D’Onofrio was able to
provide Trooper Glover with a picture of Brathwaite already in the
department’s possession. 148 No explanation was given for having Trooper
Glover identify the suspect from a single photo rather than from an array of
photos or a lineup of live persons.
Prior to its consideration of Brathwaite’s claim, the Supreme Court had
recognized that asking an eyewitness to confirm the identity of a single
testimony in the past three decades. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
142
That the Supreme Court would back away from a degree and type of regulation that
was designed for the Prohibition Era is quite consistent with what Orin Kerr describes as an
equilibrium-adjustment theory of the Fourth Amendment. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 480–81
(arguing that “when new technology or social practice makes evidence substantially harder for
the government to obtain” the Court relaxes Fourth Amendment protections; when evidence
becomes easier to obtain, the Court makes the Fourth Amendment requirements more
stringent). For a criticism of this view of the Fourth Amendment, see Christopher Slobogin,
An Original Take on Originalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 14 (2011).
143
See Steiker, supra note 19, at 2507.
144
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
145
Id. at 101.
146
Id. at 99–101.
147
Id. at 101.
148
Id.
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person “has been widely condemned” as risking an “irreparable mistaken
identification.”149 The Court in Stovall v. Denno recognized, however, that
there were times when these types of admittedly suggestive identification
procedures, though fraught with the potential for error, are the best
identifications possible. 150 In Stovall, for instance, the only witness to a
murder was the victim’s seriously wounded widow whose chances for
survival were not good. 151 Due process, the Court reasoned, would not
preclude the admission of such an identification that represented the only
possibility for the only witness to exonerate or identify the suspect.152 Stovall
could have been deemed to create an exigent circumstance exception to a
prohibition on suggestive identification procedures, but the Supreme Court
subsequently took a different path, unmooring the regulation of eyewitness
regulation from a deterrence model.
With its decision in Neil v. Biggers, the Court made clear that police
procedures threatening misidentification would be less deterred than illegal
physical searches that produced reliable evidence. In Biggers, decided five
years before Brathwaite’s case, a rape victim had come to the police station
seven months after her attack to identify a person who may have been her
assailant.153 The victim had been unable to identify the attacker from previous
lineups and photo arrays. 154 Unlike in Stovall, nothing explained why the
victim was presented with only one person to identify. No exigent
circumstances prevented the assembly of a traditional lineup, particularly
given that the identification occurred in a police station. The Supreme Court
in Neil, however, admitted the evidence, finding “the identification was
reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”155
Notwithstanding the problematic precedent of Biggers, Nowell
Brathwaite’s lawyer understandably argued that the fruits of a suggestive
identification procedure should be excluded unless the prosecution could
explain why another procedure could not have been used. There was a lot to
commend Brathwaite’s argument. The identification in Neil had occurred
before the Supreme Court’s criticism of suggestive lineups in Stovall and,
more importantly, there was a very compelling ring to Brathwaite’s argument
for deterring suggestive identification practices. The Second Circuit in this
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 302.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
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case reasoned that by excluding all identifications obtained through
“unnecessarily suggested confrontation procedures” it would deter
subsequent suggestive procedures that might be unreliable and exclude
identifications that may be inaccurate.156 The Supreme Court had, in fact,
used a similar argument to support the Miranda rule. The Miranda waiver
requirement, the Court reasoned, would prevent the admission of confessions
obtained by overbearing the suspect’s will, even though the involuntariness
of the statement may not be apparent from the circumstances.157
By 1977, when the Court decided Manson v. Brathwaite, however, the
Supreme Court was not as sympathetic to the need to manage investigative
techniques as it had been when Miranda was decided—at least not when the
price of regulating police was the exclusion of reliable evidence. Richard
Nixon’s presidential campaign in 1968 placed no small emphasis on the
damage he claimed the Court had done to law enforcement interests.158 The
Court, for reasons that are only partly attributable to Nixon’s judicial
appointees, began to retreat from many of the broad criminal justice
principles announced by the Warren Court.159
The principle of stare decisis is, however, a fairly powerful one, even
when courts fundamentally disagree with previous decisions.160 An aboutface even on very controversial decisions, perhaps especially on very
controversial decisions, can undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary. The
most controversial aspects of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence—Miranda and the exclusionary rule—thus remained, but the
principles underpinning these decisions were not taken to their logical
conclusions—and a variety of decisions limited the scope of these rules.161
156
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977) (comparing the court of appeals’
approaches).
157
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
158
See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 130 n.117
(1998) (“Richard Nixon made Miranda one of the centerpieces of his 1968 ‘law and order’
campaign.”); Steiker, supra note 19, at 2466 (noting that Nixon targeted “the Warren Court’s
controversial decisions” in the area of constitutional criminal procedure and that when he won
the presidency and quickly replaced the Chief Justice and three Associate Justices with three
appointees of his own, “it was widely predicted that the major innovations of the Warren Court
in constitutional criminal procedures. . . would not long survive.”).
159
As early as 1969, the Supreme Court was attempting to cabin the scope of the
exclusionary rule. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (recognizing standing
limits on the exclusionary rule to preserve reliability concerns).
160
See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era
to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 653 (1999) (“Stare decisis is also thought to
preserve the Court’s legitimacy.”).
161
See Steiker, supra note 19, at 2480–85.
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The Warren Court’s restrictions on investigative procedures had been limited
to those concerns that had lingered since Prohibition—search and
interrogation practices. By the time identification procedures were
considered in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court’s willingness to use the
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct had waned substantially—the
momentum of Prohibition Era concerns did not extend to new concerns as
the election of Richard Nixon changed the Court.
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Brathwaite’s deterrence-based
rationale for excluding the identification in his case reads like a broadside
attack on the exclusionary rule generally. While the Court recognized the
“surprising unanimity among scholars” in favor of excluding all suggestive
identifications, such a rule would “keep[] evidence from the jury that is
reliable and relevant.”162 The Court, citing Brewer v. Williams and United
States v. Janis, recognized its own changing sentiment on the exclusionary
rule, observing that “inflexible rules of exclusion that may frustrate rather
than promote justice have not been viewed recently by this Court with
unlimited enthusiasm.”163
Certainly, the Court was correct that there were decisions prior to
Brathwaite limiting the rule that denied reliable evidence to find-finders.
Throughout the 1970s, the Court limited the scope of the exclusionary rule,
finding that the costs of the rule exceeded its benefits.164 The Court identified
categories in which it concluded that the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary
rule was outweighed by its costs, but, of course, the cost of losing convictions
and the value of deterring misconduct are measured in very different ways.165
In a 1969 case that would set the stage for limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule, the Court concluded that there was insufficient benefit to
giving a remedy to anyone other than those whose rights had been violated:166
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police
have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative
evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We
adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of
162

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1977).
Id. at 113.
164
Arnold H. Loewy, The Exclusionary Rule as a Remedy, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 369,
370 (2014) (“The Court does attempt to assess the value of the exclusionary rule on a costbenefit basis, albeit . . . not very well.”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical
Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 210–
41 (2005) (describing the efforts of the Court to rein in the exclusionary rule using a costbenefit analysis).
165
Oliver, supra note 164, at 210–41.
166
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179–80 (1969).
163
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extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.167

Prior to Brathwaite, the Court used this cost-benefit analysis to reject
the application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings,168 habeas
corpus actions, 169 and civil tax actions. 170 Refusing to eliminate the
exclusionary rule, the Court rejected the application of the rule to these
circumstances not previously considered by the Court, finding that the
deterrent benefit was not as strong when evidence was excluded in these
proceedings as it was when the evidence was excluded from a criminal
trial. 171 The Court’s respect for precedent, in other words, allowed the
exclusion of reliable evidence to continue, while the Court continued to
balance cost and benefit in circumstances not previously held to require
exclusion.
Timing is critical to understanding cases like Manson v. Brathwaite. The
Court considered the constitutional limits on eyewitness identification
procedures at the time when the Court was attempting to increase the amount
of reliable evidence courts could hear, without disturbing the fundamental
rule that perfectly reliable evidence could, under some circumstances, be
excluded. As the fruits of an improperly conducted eyewitness identification
had not previously been held subject to the exclusionary rule, Brathwaite
offered another opportunity for an exception. In this case, the Court explained
the exception for eyewitness identifications by observing that “[u]nlike a
warrantless search, a suggestive pre-indictment identification procedure does
not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest.”172
Of course an un-Mirandized confession does not intrude on a
constitutionally protected interest, either. Perhaps more importantly, and
something for which the Court is criticized, it is the Court alone that defines
which interests enjoy protection by deciding which expectations of privacy
are reasonable. 173 Given the broad discretion the Court has allowed itself to
167

Id. at 174–75.
See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–51 (1974).
169
See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489–95 (1976).
170
See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1976).
171
See generally Oliver, supra note 164 (explaining Calandra, Stone, and Janis). After
Brathwaite, the Court found that preventing illegally obtained evidence from being used on
cross-examination yielded insufficient deterrence to justify the loss of reliability. United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
172
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.13 (1977).
173
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (observing that the Court’s standard
for privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, “whether the individual has an expectation of
168
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determine which interests are protected, it would hardly be a stretch for the
Court to conclude that the Constitution protects an individual against
procedures that might lead to false evidence and, therefore, his wrongful
conviction and incarceration.
Unwilling to use the exclusionary rule to deter suggestive procedures,
the Court concluded that “reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony.” 174 Thus, even if police use
suggestive procedures that are highly criticized by the Supreme Court, the
resulting identification is inadmissible only if it appears to be unreliable. To
evaluate the reliability, courts are to look at the totality of circumstances,
including the eyewitness’ opportunity to view the suspect, the degree of
attention the witness paid, the accuracy of the description the witness
provided, the witness’ level of certainty, and the length of time between the
crime and the identification.175
Lack of reliability is, however, not enough to exclude an eyewitness
identification. Just as the Supreme Court recognized in the interrogation
context, the Due Process Clause does not bar the admission of unreliable
evidence—this is the domain of evidence law—but instead limits improper
police behavior.176
Thus, the Supreme Court held in Perry v. New Hampshire that the
Constitution required no consideration of a lineup’s reliability, even if the
circumstances of the identification were suggestive, so long the identification
was not coordinated by police.177 In Perry, a witness to the theft of a car
stereo was asked if she could identify the thief. She pointed out her window
and said it was a man who happened, apparently coincidentally, to be
standing next to an investigating officer in view of her window. Due process
did not require an assessment of the reliability of this identification
procedure, Justice Ginsberg concluded for the majority, because “law
enforcement officials did not arrange the suggestive circumstances” of this
identification. 178 The defendant in Perry argued that if “reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony,” then
the role police played, or didn’t play, in an unduly suggestive identification
should be irrelevant. The Court disagreed, observing that because one aim of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” has “often been criticized as
circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable”).
174
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
175
Id. at 114–16.
176
See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
177
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720–21 (2012).
178
Id. at 725–26.
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excluding improperly conducted unreliable identifications was still “to deter
law enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the
first place,” unless there was misconduct in the identification process, issues
of reliability were themselves of no constitutional significance.179
Eyewitness testimony may well be the least reliable form of evidence
typically introduced in criminal trials.180 Courts have not ignored our new
understandings of the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications, but
even when they demonstrate sensitivity to the issue, they often do less to deter
police misconduct that produces suggestive identifications than they do to
deter unlawful acts that produce physical evidence. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has perhaps attracted the most attention of any court to consider this
issue with its very thorough opinion, laden with references to empirical
research on eyewitness identifications, in State v. Henderson.181 Henderson,
however, retained the basic scheme from Brathwaite. Identification
procedures are excluded under Henderson, and Brathwaite, only if the
identification procedures were suggestive and the resulting identification
lacks reliability. Henderson used a sophisticated understanding of social
science to guide trial courts in evaluating reliability, but it did not take a
deterrence approach to police misconduct. Henderson, like Brathwaite, does
not exclude the fruits of even intentionally suggestive lineups, if they appear
reliable.182 Police thus may be willing to chance a suggestive lineup before
they would risk a questionable search. While both are appropriately deterred,
179

Id. at 726.
See George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State Standards for the Admission of
Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 102
(2011) (describing factors discovered from social science explaining “precisely why
eyewitnesses are so often incorrect”).
181
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). A number of law review articles
recognized the thoroughness and groundbreaking quality of the opinion. See, e.g., Amy D.
Trenary, State v. Henderson: A Model for Admitting Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 84
U. COLO. L. REV. 1257 (2013); Dana Walsh, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call
for Greater State Involvement to Ensure Fundamental Fairness, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1415, 1449–
53 (2013) (describing “New Jersey as a model” because of the Henderson case); Benjamin
Wiener, Comment, Revisiting the Manson Test: Social Science as a Source of Constitutional
Interpretation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 861, 862–63 (2014) (describing Henderson as the
notable amendment to the “due process test for the admissibility of eyewitness evidence” by
a state court); Robert Couch, Comment, A Model for Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry
v. New Hampshire, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1535 (2013) (celebrating Henderson decision). It is
ironic that Henderson has received the bulk of the academic attention. Two states,
Massachusetts and New York, automatically exclude lineups that are unduly suggestive. See
Epstein, supra note 16, at 80 (2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560
n.3 (Mass. 2006); People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 543 (1991)).
182
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928.
180

7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER

1030

11/29/2016 2:12 PM

OLIVER

[Vol. 105

only the admission of the former risks a wrongful conviction.
CONCLUSION
The legacy of Prohibition is a system of police regulation that is
completely backwards. Drugs found in an unlawful search of a trunk will be
excluded even though highly probative of guilt and discovered through a
procedure that was likely to disclose innocent behavior no more private than
the possession of a jack and tire iron. 183 A confession containing no
objectionable tactics, bearing no indications of unreliability, and
corroborated by physical evidence, is excluded if police merely fail to
provide the suspect with warnings that any American citizen with a television
set could recite in his sleep. This sort of reliable evidence is excluded,
according to hornbook constitutional criminal procedure, to discourage
improper police conduct. Yet when police create suggestive lineups, or lie to
suspects in interrogation rooms, when they engage in objectionable conduct
that may create unreliable evidence, the deterrence rationale applicable to
other police tactics does not require the evidence to be excluded. And as
constitutional criminal procedure is designed to regulate police behavior, not
ensure the reliability of evidence, a mere showing that an identification is
unreliable, regardless of the method of the identification, is not a sufficient
basis to exclude the identification. Yet, there is something quite bizarre about
a system of police regulation that more carefully scrutinizes procedures that
can only produce reliable evidence than processes that may produce false
convictions.
Legal developments produce a momentum that can feel almost preordained when its context is not understood. The fact that the origins of our
unique concern about searches for reliable evidence lie in a quirky period in
our nation’s history provides a basis for overhauling our structure of criminal
procedure to deter in equal measure police tactics that threaten to produce
unreliable evidence. If we are to maintain a system of constitutional criminal
procedure that is much more cautious about admitting reliable evidence than
potentially unreliable evidence, we ought to have a better rationale than a
historical practice that grew out of an idiosyncratic period of American
history.

183

Cf. Stuntz, supra note 27, at 1019 (noting irony of the fact that current Fourth
Amendment law allows police to uncover “a suspect’s finances or phone calls” but not the
contents of a lunch bag).

